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ABSTRACT: The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act”
includes what is called an “individual responsibility requirement”
or mandate that all persons buy health insurance from a private
company and a separate “penalty” enforcing this requirement. In
this paper, I do not critique the individual mandate on originalist
grounds. Instead, I explain why the individual mandate is unconstitutional under the existing doctrine by which the Supreme Court
construes the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses and the
tax power. There are three principal claims.
First (Part II), since the New Deal, the Supreme Court has developed a doctrine allowing the regulation of wholly intrastate activity:
the substantial effects doctrine. Although commonly conceived as a
Commerce Clause doctrine, from its inception this doctrine has
been grounded in the Necessary and Proper Clause. In the 1990s,
the Supreme Court developed a judicially administrable test for
whether it is “necessary” for Congress to reach intrastate activity
that substantially affects interstate commerce: the distinction between economic and noneconomic intrastate activity. Because the
individual mandate fails to satisfy the requirements of this test as
understood under existing doctrine, it exceeds the power granted to
Congress by the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses as
currently construed by the Supreme Court. The mandate also fails
to satisfy an alternative to the substantial effects doctrine that was
proposed by Justice Scalia in a concurring opinion in Gonzales v.
Raich because it extends beyond the regulation of intrastate activity
to reach inactivity.
Second (Part III), because the “individual responsibility requirement” purports to be a regulation of commerce and cannot
possibly be construed as a tax, it is not justified under the tax power
of Congress; and, if the “requirement” or mandate is an unconstitutional regulation, there is nothing for the “penalty” to enforce. Neither is the penalty, considered apart from the regulatory requirement, a tax under current doctrine.
Third (Part IV), the Supreme Court should not further expand
Congress’s power beyond existing doctrine to allow it to mandate
that individuals engage in economic activity by entering into contracts with private companies. Such economic mandates are directly
analogous to the commandeering of the states that the Supreme
Court has held to be an improper exercise of the commerce power.
The very few mandates that are imposed on the people pertain to
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their fundamental duties as citizens of the United States, such as the
duty to defend the country or to pay for its operation. A newfound
congressional power to impose economic mandates to facilitate the
regulation of interstate commerce would fundamentally alter the
relationship of citizen and state by unconstitutionally commandeering the people.
In Part V, I conclude with a “realist” assessment of the likelihood that the Supreme Court will actually find the mandate to be
unconstitutional.
I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT THE CONSTITUTION SAYS
The “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” includes what
is called an “individual responsibility requirement” that all persons
buy health insurance from a private company. 1 Is this requirement
constitutional? There are three ways to analyze whether a law is
constitutional or not. Does it conflict with what the Constitution
says? Does it conflict with what the Supreme Court has said? Are
there five votes for a particular result? Unless we are clear about
which sense of “unconstitutional” we are using, we are likely to talk
past each other.
In my book Restoring the Lost Constitution, 2 I defend interpreting
the text of the Constitution according to its original public meaning.
I also contend that the evidence is overwhelming that the core
original public meaning of “commerce” was trade or exchange of
goods, including their transportation. Commerce means “with merchandise” and shares the same root as “merchants.” Even broadened to include all “intercourse” between states, commerce is still
confined to the communication of something—whether goods,
people, or messages—from one state to another. Commerce constitutes a subset of economic activity that is distinct from the economic
activities of manufacturing or agriculture, both of which involve the
production of the things to be transported or communicated from

1 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501, 124 Stat.
119 (2010).
2 RANDY E. BARNETT, RESTORING THE LOST CONSTITUTION: THE PRESUMPTION OF
LIBERTY (2005).
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one state to another.
Not only was this the original meaning of “commerce,” but the
Supreme Court has never expressly updated or broadened its
meaning of the Commerce Clause, which says that Congress has the
power “to regulate Commerce . . . among the Several states.” 3 Instead, during the New Deal, the Supreme Court used the Necessary
and Proper Clause to allow Congress to regulate economic activities
that were neither interstate nor commerce because such activities
had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
Under the original meaning of “commerce,” insurance contracts
did not qualify. Such contracts are mere promises to pay money
upon the occurrence of specified conditions, and do not involve the
conveyance of goods or other items from one state to another. And
so the Supreme Court held in the 1869 case of Paul v. Virginia that
“issuing a policy of insurance is not a transaction of commerce.” 4
As the Court in Paul elaborated:
The policies are simple contracts of indemnity against loss
by fire, entered into between the corporations and the assured, for a consideration paid by the latter. These contracts
are not articles of commerce in any proper meaning of the
word. They are not subjects of trade and barter offered in
the market as something having an existence and value independent of the parties to them. They are not commodities
to be shipped or forwarded from one State to another, and
then put up for sale. They are like other personal contracts
between parties which are completed by their signature and
the transfer of the consideration. 5
What is more, the Court further held that the fact that an insurance
company and the insured were in different states did not render an
insurance contract interstate commerce.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 cl. 3.
Paul v. Virginia, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 168, 183 (1868).
5 Id.
3
4
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Such contracts are not interstate transactions, though the
parties may be domiciled in different States. The policies do
not take effect—are not executed contracts—until delivered
by the agent in Virginia. They are, then, local transactions,
and are governed by the local law. They do not constitute a
part of the commerce between the States any more than a
contract for the purchase and sale of goods in Virginia by a
citizen of New York whilst in Virginia would constitute a
portion of such commerce. 6
It is worth noting that Paul was decided in 1869, well before
what came to be derisively called the Lochner Era. Thus, under the
original meaning of the Commerce Clause, as affirmed by the
Court, Congress lacks any power over the health insurance business. The insurance business, like the businesses of manufacturing
or agriculture, is to be regulated exclusively by the states.
And so matters stood for 75 years—or more accurately for 150
years since the Founding—until the New Deal Supreme Court revisited the issue in 1944. In United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters, 7 the Court for the first time allowed Congress to regulate the
interstate insurance business. In his opinion, Justice Black purported to adhere to original meaning: “Ordinarily courts do not
construe words used in the Constitution so as to give them a meaning more narrow than one which they had in the common parlance
of the times in which the Constitution was written.” 8 He then concluded that, “[t]o hold that the word ‘commerce’ as used in the
Commerce Clause does not include a business such as insurance
would do just that.” 9 Based only on a solitary passing observation
by Alexander Hamilton concerning insurance, and the fact that “the

Id.
United States v. Se. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
8 Id. at 539.
9 Id.
6
7
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dictionaries, encyclopedias, and other books of the period show that
it included trade,” 10 Justice Black contended that
a heavy burden is on him who asserts that the plenary
power which the Commerce Clause grants to Congress to
regulate ‘Commerce among the several States’ does not include the power to regulate trading in insurance to the
same extent that it includes power to regulate other trades
or businesses conducted across state lines. 11
But what of Paul and the seventy-five years’ worth of cases that
relied on it as precedent? Justice Black made short work of the nowhallowed doctrine of stare decisis. All of these cases, he contended,
involved upholding state insurance regulations that had been essential in the absence of congressional regulation. The existence of
these state regulatory schemes did not deprive Congress of its
power to enter the field. And so was born the authority for Congress to regulate health insurance companies that had, until then,
been exclusively regulated by the states. 12
It is not my purpose here to demonstrate that the New Deal
Court was wrong and even disingenuous when it claimed that the
power to regulate the insurance business was justified by original
meaning, though I do not mind recalling the Court’s willingness to
ignore a seventy-five-year-old well-entrenched precedent to uphold
the post-New Deal powers of Congress. Nor will I be contesting the
constitutionality of the individual mandate on the ground that it
violates the original meaning of what the Constitution says.
Instead, my claim is that the mandate is unconstitutional in the
second sense: based on what the Supreme Court has said in its Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause decisions, presented in
Part II—and also in its tax power decisions, presented in Part III.

Id.
Id. (footnote omitted).
12 Immediately after South-Eastern Underwriters, Congress passed the McCarranFerguson Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011–1015 (1945) in order to preserve the existing state
regulatory schemes.
10
11
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Existing doctrine reveals the individual mandate is unconstitutional
even if we assume that Congress has the power to regulate the insurance business that the New Deal Supreme Court gave it in SouthEastern Underwriters.
My position rests entirely on post-New Deal constitutional
cases and doctrine, except where that doctrine does not reach a definitive conclusion so new reasoning is required. In Part IV, I contend that the Supreme Court should not extend the powers of Congress beyond what is authorized by existing law to uphold a mandate on individuals to engage in economic activity. Finally, in Part
V, I conclude by briefly addressing the likelihood that the Supreme
Court would actually hold the mandate unconstitutional.
II. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND EXISTING COMMERCE AND
NECESSARY AND PROPER CLAUSE DOCTRINE
A. Existing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause Doctrine
1. THE LAW PROFESSORS’ UNDERSTANDING.
Let me begin by telling the story of the Supreme Court’s Commerce Clause doctrine the way that most law professors today both
teach and understand it. Until 1995, law professors believed that,
beginning in 1937 with cases such as NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 13 United States v. Darby, 14 and Wickard v. Filburn, 15 the Supreme Court had so expanded the scope of the commerce power of
Congress that Congress could do anything it wanted provided it
was not violating some other constitutional constraint, like the First
Amendment.
Law professors were shocked, then, when the Supreme Court in
1995 held in United States v. Lopez 16 that the Gun Free School Zone
Act unconstitutionally exceeded the commerce power of Congress.
They interpreted this case as an aberration. By 1995, Congress had

NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937).
United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941).
15 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
16 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
13
14
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become so complacent about the scope of its powers that it did not
even bother to make findings about why the act was within its
commerce power. Most law professors were confident that, in the
future, the Court would uphold any law if Congress made adequate
findings that the activity it sought to regulate had a substantial effect on interstate commerce.
So law professors were, once again, surprised when the Supreme Court in 2000 held in United States v. Morrison 17 that the Violence Against Women Act was unconstitutional—notwithstanding
extensive hearings and findings about the substantial effects of violence against women on interstate commerce. In the wake of Morrison, law professors started to believe that the Court just might be
serious about drawing a line between what is national and what is
local, and lower courts started to be more receptive to Commerce
Clause challenges.
In one such case I helped bring on behalf of Angel Raich and
Diane Monson, the Ninth Circuit held that the Controlled Substances Act was unconstitutional as applied to marijuana grown at
home for medical use as authorized by state law. 18 When the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich 19 turned away this challenge, however, law professors breathed a sigh of relief that they had been
right all along. They reverted to their pre-Lopez understanding that
Congress can do pretty much whatever it wants under its commerce power.
Indeed, the new conventional wisdom is that, so long as Congress establishes a sweeping and ambitious regulatory scheme, it
can reach any activity—whether economic or not—that it deems to
be essential to that scheme. In other words, the more grandiose the
claim of power by Congress, the stronger is its claim of constitutionality.
Hence some law professors have confidently asserted that Congress may, for the first time in American history, use its commerce

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Raich v. Ashcroft, 352 F.3d 1222 (9th Cir. 2003).
19 Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
17
18
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power to mandate that all individuals in the United States engage in
economic activity. 20 After all, this mandate is essential to Congress’s
grandiose new scheme regulating private insurance companies, so
under Raich, it must be constitutional.
Of course, when evaluating the individual mandate, five Justices are always free to disregard what the Court has previously
said, just as Justice Black and a majority of Justices did in SouthEastern Underwriters. But this raises the third sense of constitutionality: what we can predict five Justices will do. Before we get to that
issue, we need first to examine what the Supreme Court has said
and what it has not said about the Commerce Clause. It is to this
question I now turn.
2. THE NEW DEAL AND WARREN COURT’S CASES.
Before 1937, the Supreme Court had held that Congress could
not use its power over interstate commerce as a pretext to reach
such economic but noncommercial intrastate activities as manufacturing or agriculture, activities which were instead within the police
power of states to regulate. 21 In 1937, in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel, 22 the Supreme Court held for the first time that Congress
could regulate the labor relations of manufacturers and their workers because labor strife affected interstate commerce by obstructing
the flow of manufactured goods bound for the interstate market. As
the Court stated, “acts which directly burden or obstruct interstate
or foreign commerce, or its free flow, are within the reach of the
congressional power.” 23 Such acts “are not rendered immune because they grow out of labor disputes. It is the effect upon commerce, not the source of the injury, which is the criterion.” 24

20 See, e.g., Mark A. Hall, The Constitutionality of Mandates to Purchase Health Insurance (The O'Neill Institute for National and Global Health Law, Wake Forest Univ.
Legal
Studies
Paper
No.
1334955),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1334955.
21 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
22 NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
23 Id. at 31.
24 Id. at 31–32.
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In other words, although the activity being regulated was not
commerce, it could be reached because of its effects on commerce.
“Although activities may be intrastate in character when separately
considered, if they have such a close and substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to
protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress
cannot be denied the power to exercise that control.” 25 Nevertheless, the Court concluded its opinion by offering the following reaffirmation of the scheme of limited and enumerated powers: “Undoubtedly the scope of this power must be considered in the light of
our dual system of government,” wrote Chief Justice Hughes, “and
may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our
complex society, would effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a completely
centralized government.” 26
Then in 1941, in United States v. Darby 27 the Court further expanded the power of Congress. Exactly how it did so will prove
important in assessing the constitutionality of the individual mandate. In Darby, the Court separately considered two distinct powers
asserted by Congress in the Fair Labor Standards Act. First was the
“power to prohibit the shipment in interstate commerce of lumber
manufactured by employees whose wages are less than a prescribed
minimum or whose weekly hours of labor at that wage are greater
than a prescribed maximum.” 28 In assessing this claim of power,
as in Jones & Laughlin Steel, the Court in Darby did not reject the
original meaning of “commerce.” Instead, it said that, “[w]hile
manufacture is not of itself interstate commerce the shipment of manufactured goods interstate is such commerce and the prohibition of
such shipment by Congress is indubitably a regulation of the com-

Id. at 37.
Id. (emphasis added).
27 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100 (1941).
28 Id. at 108.
25
26
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merce.” 29 As authority for this proposition the Court relied heavily
on Chief Justice Marshall’s evaluation of the Commerce Clause in
Gibbons v. Ogden. 30 In sum, the prohibition on shipping specified
goods in interstate commerce was a direct exercise of Congress’s
power over interstate commerce.
Yet, although Darby did not expand the meaning of “commerce” to uphold this part of the statute, it did importantly expand
the power of Congress by refusing to examine whether the Congressional assertion of its commerce power was a pretext for reaching activity that fell within the police power of states: “The motive
and purpose of a regulation of interstate commerce are matters for
the legislative judgment upon the exercise of which the Constitution places no restriction and over which the courts are given no
control,” 31 wrote Justice Stone. “Whatever their motive and purpose, regulations of commerce which do not infringe some constitutional prohibition are within the plenary power conferred on Congress by the Commerce Clause.” 32
The Court then turned its attention to a different claim of
power, the power “to prohibit the employment of workmen in the
production of goods ‘for interstate commerce’ at other than prescribed wages and hours.” 33 In assessing “whether such restriction
on the production of goods for commerce is a permissible exercise
of the commerce power,” the Court held that the “power of Congress over interstate commerce is not confined to the regulation of
commerce among the states.” 34 The power also “extends to those activities intrastate which so affect interstate commerce or the exercise of
the power of Congress over it as to make regulation of them appropriate means to the attainment of a legitimate end, the exercise of the
granted power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce.” 35

Id. at 113 (emphases added).
See id. at 113–14.
31 Id. at 115.
32 Id.
33 Id. at 105.
34 Id. at 118 (emphasis added).
35 Id.
29
30
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As authority for this principle, the Court relied not on the
Commerce Clause case of Gibbons but instead upon the Necessary
and Proper Clause Case of McCulloch v. Maryland. 36 This tells us
that the “substantial effects” doctrine established by the New Deal
Court concerns the application of the Necessary and Proper Clause
in the context of the commerce power. In other words it is a doctrine applying, explaining, and implicitly limiting the use of “necessary and proper” means to execute Congress’s power over interstate commerce.
This was big. To uphold the first of these claims of power, the
Court abandoned one of the principal limits on the Necessary and
Proper Clause that Chief Justice John Marshall had asserted in
McCulloch:
Should Congress, in the execution of its powers, adopt
measures which are prohibited by the constitution; or
should Congress, under the pretext of executing its powers, pass
laws for the accomplishment of objects not entrusted to the government; it would become the painful duty of this tribunal,
should a case requiring such a decision come before it, to
say that such an act was not the law of the land. 37
So important was this qualification to Marshall that he invoked
this passage in defense of his decision in McCulloch when writing
anonymously as “A Friend of the Constitution.” 38 So, by discarding
this aspect of McCulloch, the Supreme Court in Darby again broke
sharply from over one-hundred years of its own doctrine.
Darby is also big because, to uphold the second claim of power,
the Court allowed Congress to regulate wholly intrastate activities
under the Necessary and Proper Clause that it could not justify as a
regulation of interstate commerce itself. The doctrine allowing Con-

36
37

See id.
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 423 (1819) (emphasis added).
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gress to regulate intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce, therefore, defines the scope of the Necessary and
Proper Clause. Therefore, all future cases applying this doctrine are
not, strictly speaking, “Commerce Clause cases.” Instead, they are
“Necessary and Proper Clause cases” in the context of the regulation of interstate commerce. 39
Then came Wickard v. Filburn, 40 in which the Court upheld the
provisions of the Agricultural Adjustment Act, which limited the
quantity of wheat that an individual farmer could grow, not to sell
on the interstate market, but to consume on the farm by feeding his
livestock and his family. As historian Barry Cushman has chronicled, 41 the implications of upholding this claim of power were so
disturbing to the New Deal Justices that they held the matter over
for reargument. Yet, Justice Jackson’s opinion made the case seem
like a natural application of the Necessary and Proper Clause. “The
question would merit little consideration since our decision in
United States v. Darby, sustaining the federal power to regulate production of goods for commerce,” he wrote, “except for the fact that
this Act extends federal regulation to production not intended in
any part for commerce but wholly for consumption on the farm.” 42
Once again, the Court did not expand the meaning of “commerce” beyond its original meaning when upholding the power of
Congress to reach intrastate activity that is not itself commerce:
“[E]ven if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate

38 John Marshall, A Friend of the Constitution, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 5, 1819,
reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND 187 (Gerald
Gunther ed., Stanford University Press 1969).
39 See J. Randy Beck, The New Jurisprudence of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 2002
U. ILL. L. REV. 581, 619 (2002) (“[T]he ‘affecting commerce’ cases derive from the
Necessary and Proper Clause . . . .”); and id. at 618–19 (discussing Darby).
40 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
41 BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF A
CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION 212–19 (1998).
42 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 118.
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commerce. . . .” 43 It then adopted the principle that the fact that Roscoe Filburn’s “own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal regulation where, as here, his contribution, taken together with
that of many others similarly situated, is far from trivial.” 44
In Wickard, the government contended that “the statute . . . is
sustainable as a ‘necessary and proper’ implementation of the
power of Congress over interstate commerce.” 45 Once again, the
Court in Wickard relied not only on Gibbons, but on McCulloch as
well. 46 In short, like Darby, Wickard is both a Commerce Clause and
a Necessary and Proper Clause case. So too were the civil rights
cases of Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States 47 and Katzenbach v.
McClung. 48
In Heart of Atlanta, the Court found that because Congress had
the power to regulate and protect the interstate flow of persons,
racial discrimination in the provision of public accommodations
burdened that flow and Congress therefore had the power to reach
this otherwise intrastate activity. “[T]he power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power to regulate the
local incidents thereof, including local activities in both the States of
origin and destination, which might have a substantial and harmful
effect upon that commerce.” 49 In response to the objection that “the
operation of the motel here is of a purely local character,” the Court
quoted the passage from Darby that relied on McCulloch, including
the citation to the case. 50 Likewise, in McClung, when the Court
turned its consideration to “The Power of Congress to Regulate
Local Activities,” 51 it rested the power of Congress to reach intrastate activities on the power of Congress “‘[t]o regulate Commerce .

Id. at 125 (emphasis added).
Id. at 127–28.
45 Id. at 119 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18).
46 Id. at 129, n.29.
47 Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241 (1964).
48 Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964).
49 Heart of Atlanta, 379 U.S. at 258.
50 See id. (quoting United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)).
43
44
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. . among the several States’ and . . . the power ‘[t]o make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers. . . .’” 52
3. THE REHNQUIST COURT CASES.
With these canonical cases in mind, let us now fast forward to
consider how the Supreme Court interpreted its own substantial
effects doctrine in Lopez, Morrison and Raich. In Lopez, Chief Justice
Rehnquist famously affirmed that “[w]e start with first principles.
The Constitution creates a Federal Government of enumerated
powers. . . . As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers delegated by the
proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined. Those which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’” 53
The Chief Justice then identified “three broad categories of activity that Congress may regulate under its commerce power.” 54
First, “Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate
commerce.” 55 Second, “Congress is empowered to regulate and
protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or
things in interstate commerce, even though the threat may come
only from intrastate activities.” 56 Finally, “Congress’ commerce authority includes the power to regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate commerce . . . those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.” 57
Turning to the third of these categories, Chief Justice Rehnquist
offered the following summary of the “substantial effects” cases
decided since the New Deal: “[W]e have upheld a wide variety of
congressional Acts regulating intrastate economic activity where we
have concluded that the activity substantially affected interstate

Katzenbach, 379 U.S. at 301–02.
Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, 18).
53 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
54 Id. at 558.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id. at 558–59.
51
52

596

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 5:581

commerce.” 58 He then provided the following examples: “the regulation of intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate credit transactions, restaurants utilizing substantial interstate supplies, inns
and hotels catering to interstate guests, and production and consumption of home-grown wheat.” 59 From these, he concluded that
“the pattern is clear. Where economic activity substantially affects
interstate commerce, legislation regulating that activity will be sustained.” 60 Because the Gun Free School Zone Act regulated a “class
of activity” that lay outside the scope of this doctrine—the noneconomic activity of possessing a gun within 1000 feet of a school—it
was held to be unconstitutional.
The above analysis of N.L.R.B., Darby, Wickard, Heart of Atlanta,
and McClung reveals that the judicial doctrine by which Congress
may reach intrastate economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce rested on the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Then, in Lopez, the Court restricted this combined power to the
regulation of economic activity. “Even Wickard,” wrote Chief Justice
Rehnquist, “which is perhaps the most far reaching example of
Commerce Clause authority over intrastate activity, involved economic activity in a way that the possession of a gun in a school zone
does not.” 61 In this way the distinction between economic and
noneconomic intrastate activity provided a limiting doctrine on the
reach of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Breyer objected to the majority’s distinction between “economic” and “noneconomic” intrastate
activity. “Although the majority today attempts to categorize Perez,
McClung, and Wickard as involving intrastate ‘economic activity,’
the Courts that decided each of those cases did not focus upon the
economic nature of the activity regulated. Rather, they focused
upon whether that activity affected interstate or foreign com-

Id. at 559.
Id. at 559–60 (citations omitted).
60 Id. at 560 (emphasis added).
61 Id.
58
59

2010]

Commandeering the People

597

merce.” 62 To this Chief Justice Rehnquist responded that, by the
reasoning of the government and Justice Breyer, “we are hard
pressed to posit any activity by an individual that Congress is without power to regulate.” 63
In order to preserve the constitutional scheme of limited and
enumerated powers, some line was needed to separate wholly intrastate activities that Congress could reach from intrastate activities that were solely within the police power of states. Chief Justice
Rehnquist identified this line by looking back over all the previous
substantial effects cases to see what they had in common: the regulation of intrastate economic activity. And he drew this line notwithstanding Justice Breyer’s objection that the distinction between
economic and noneconomic activity had not been highlighted or
even discussed in these previous cases.
But why draw the line at noneconomic intrastate activity? To
answer this question, we need to revisit the argument over the constitutionality of the national bank that was upheld in McCulloch v.
Maryland. 64 In response to the argument that such a bank was not
truly necessary under the Necessary and Proper Clause, Chief Justice John Marshall famously equated (or seemed to equate) the
meaning of “necessary” with “convenient.” “If reference be had to
its use, in the common affairs of the world, or in approved authors,”
the word “necessary,” “frequently imports no more than that one
thing is convenient, or useful, or essential to another. To employ the
means necessary to an end, is generally understood as employing
any means calculated to produce the end. . . .” 65
This passage became famous because the matter of convenience
would seem to concern policy choices that lie beyond the purview
of the courts. As President Madison, who supported the result in
McCulloch, privately objected: “Does not the court also relinquish,
by their doctrine, all control on the legislative exercise of unconsti-

Id. at 628 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 564 (majority opinion).
64 McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (4 Wheat.) (1819).
65 Id. at 413–14.
62
63
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tutional powers?” 66 When the matter of a measure’s necessity “assumes the character of mere expediency or policy,” it becomes
“evidently beyond the reach of Judicial cognizance. . . . [B]y what
handle could the Court take hold of the case?” 67
In response to stinging public criticisms of the decision, Marshall defended his opinion in a series of newspaper essays writing
pseudonymously as “A Friend to the Union,” and later as “A Friend
of the Constitution.” 68 In these essays, Marshall invoked a less wellknown passage of McCulloch that omitted the word “convenient,”
and defined “necessary” as “‘needful,’ ‘requisite,’ ‘essential,’ ‘conducive to,’ . . .” 69 While granting Congress’s discretion as to means,
Marshall denied that the Court ever said “that the word ‘necessary’
means whatever may be ‘convenient,’ or ‘useful.’ And when it uses
‘conducive to,’ that word is associated with others plainly showing
that no remote, no distant conduciveness to the object, is in the mind of
the court.” 70 In a later letter, Marshall said that the constitutionality
of a particular means “depends on their being the natural, direct,
and appropriate means, or the known and usual means, for the execution of the given power.” 71
In defending his opinion in McCulloch, Marshall claimed the authority of the “masterly argument” made years before by then-Secretary of
the Treasury Alexander Hamilton in his opinion provided to President
Washington on behalf of the constitutionality of the first national bank.
Marshall quoted this passage from Hamilton’s opinion: “That every
power vested in a government, is, in its nature, sovereign, and in-

Letter from James Madison to Judge Spencer Roane (Sept. 2, 1819), in 3 LETTERS
143, 144 (Phila., J.P. Lippincott & Co. 1867).
67 Id.
68 See John Marshall, Letters to the Editor, “A Friend to the Union”, PHILA. UNION,
Apr. 24–28, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V.
MARYLAND, supra note 38, at 78; and John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”
essays, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, June 30–July 15, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S
DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra note 38, at 155.
69 McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 418.
70 John Marshall, Letter to the Editor, “A Friend to the Union”, PHILA. UNION, Apr.
28, 1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra
note 38, at 100 (emphasis added).
71 Id. (emphasis added).
66
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cludes, by force of the term a right to employ all the means requisite
and fairly applicable to the attainment of the ends of such power.” 72
In many respects Marshall’s opinion on McCulloch could be
characterized as plagiarizing his mentor Hamilton’s opinion on the
first bank. 73 Here is how Hamilton defines “necessary”: According
to “the grammatical” and “popular sense of the term . . . necessary
often means no more than needful, requisite, incidental, useful or conducive to.” 74 But while Hamilton, like Marshall, strongly rejected an
overly strict reading of necessary “as if the word absolutely, or indispensably, had been prefixed to it,” 75 he also rejected a completely open-ended reading of “necessary and proper.” “It may
truly be said of every Government, as well as that of the United
States, that it only has a right to pass such laws as are necessary and
proper to accomplish the objects intrusted to it: for no government
has a right to do merely what it pleases.” 76
Hamilton then considered what should be the legal “test” for
whether a measure was necessary under the clause. First, he rejected the idea that such a test should attempt to weigh the degree
of necessity. “The degree in which a measure is necessary, can
never be a test of the legal right to adopt it. That must be a matter of
opinion; and can only be a test of expediency.” 77 Instead, Hamilton
then offered this test: “The relation between the measure and the end,
between the nature of the mean employed toward the execution of a
power and the object of that power, must be the criterion of constitutionality; not the more or less of necessity or utility.” 78

72 John Marshall, “A Friend of the Constitution”, ALEXANDRIA GAZETTE, July 2,
1819, reprinted in JOHN MARSHALL’S DEFENSE OF MCCULLOCH V. MARYLAND, supra
note 38, at 176.
73 See Beck, supra note 39, at 600-03 (comparing the two opinions).
74 Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (Feb. 23,
1791), in LEGISLATIVE AND DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE BANK OF THE UNITED
STATES 95, 97 (M. St. Clair Clarke & D. A. Hall eds., Augustus M. Kelley Publishers
1967) (1832).
75 Id. at 98.
76 Id. (emphasis in original).
77 Id.
78 Id.
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In modern parlance, according to Hamilton, there must be an
appropriate fit between means and ends, which is exactly what the
Supreme Court’s doctrine distinguishing between economic and
noneconomic activity seeks to discern. Rather than allowing Congress to do ‘merely what it pleases,’ the economic-noneconomic distinction provides a judicially administrable line by which to identify
intrastate activities that are likely to be closely enough related to
interstate commerce as to make it appropriate for Congress to reach.
The distinction is useful because the regulation of intrastate economic activity is far more likely to be closely related to interstate
commerce than is the vast array of intrastate noneconomic activity.
As Randy Beck has explained, “Given the close relationship between intrastate and interstate economic activity, a statute regulating local economic conduct will usually be calculated to accomplish
an end legitimately encompassed within the plenary congressional
authority over interstate commerce.” 79
To paraphrase Hamilton, by adopting the distinction between
economic and noneconomic activity, the Court provided a workable
doctrine by which the necessity of a particular regulation of intrastate activity could be assessed without need for a court to evaluate
‘the more or less necessity or utility’ of the measure. 80 By limiting
the substantial effects doctrine to economic intrastate activity, the
Supreme Court provided the modern legal ‘test’ or ‘criterion of constitutionality’ for whether a regulation of intrastate activity is what
‘may truly be said’ to be necessary under the Necessary and Proper
Clause. By this doctrine Congress is held within its enumerated
powers and denied the ‘right to do merely what it pleases.’

79 Beck, supra note 39, at 625. Beck considers this test to be effectuating the requirement that a law be “proper,” rather than the requirement that it be “necessary.”
See id. at 648. Assessing whether this claim is correct on originalist grounds would
require the examination of a mass of evidence and is beyond the scope of this article.
What matters for present purposes is that Beck does not dispute, but instead insists,
that the economic-noneconomic distinction in existing “Commerce Clause” doctrine
is actually effectuating and limiting the scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause.
80 See id. at 626 (characterizing the Lopez decision as an effort to address the degree
question “on a more categorical basis, rather than through open-ended, case-by-case
consideration.”).
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Five years later, in United States v. Morrison, the Court reaffirmed the economic-noneconomic distinction within its substantial
affects doctrine: “While we need not adopt a categorical rule against
aggregating the effects of any noneconomic activity in order to decide these cases, thus far in our Nation’s history our cases have upheld Commerce Clause regulation of intrastate activity only where
that activity is economic in nature.” 81 And it rejected “petitioners’
reasoning [that] would allow Congress to regulate any crime as
long as the nationwide, aggregated impact of that crime has substantial effects on employment, production, transit, or consumption.” 82
Once again, Justice Breyer questioned the economicnoneconomic distinction. “[W]hy should we give critical constitutional importance to the economic, or noneconomic, nature of an
interstate-commerce-affecting cause? If chemical emanations
through indirect environmental change cause identical, severe
commercial harm outside a State, why should it matter whether
local factories or home fireplaces release them?” 83 Then Justice
Breyer expressly invoked the language of both the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses, which “says nothing about either
the local nature, or the economic nature, of an interstate-commerceaffecting cause.” 84
Justice Breyer was correct to invoke the Necessary and Proper
Clause. By rejecting his theory, however, the majority in Morrison in
effect refused to interpret the Necessary and Proper Clause more
expansively than the Court in Lopez read the New Deal cases to
have done. Indeed, Chief Justice Rehnquist reaffirmed the principle
articulated in N.L.R.B. that “the Constitution requires a distinction
between what is truly national and what is truly local. In recogniz-

United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 613 (2000).
Id. at 615.
83 Id. at 657 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
84 Id.
81
82
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ing this fact we preserve one of the few principles that has been
consistent since the Clause was adopted.” 85
So now we come to the 2005 case of Gonzales v. Raich. Did Raich
cast aside the lens adopted by the Court in Lopez and Morrison
through which it interpreted the post-New Deal cases that rested on
both the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses? To the contrary. When reading the majority opinion in Raich, we must keep in
mind that it had to be written in such a fashion as to attract Justice
Kennedy’s fifth vote, which it did. (Justice Scalia did not join the
Court’s opinion.)
To begin, and most importantly, the majority in Raich does not
reject the economic-noneconomic distinction, or the reading of
Wickard that was adopted by the Court in Lopez. Instead, the Court
holds that the production of marijuana is an economic activity. Here
is what Justice Stevens says: “Our case law firmly establishes Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an
economic ‘class of activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 86 He then quotes the following passage from
Wickard: “‘even if appellee’s activity be local and though it may not
be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be
reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce.’” 87
Justice Stevens explained that Wickard “establishes that Congress can regulate purely intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation
of the interstate market in that commodity.” 88 He then rejected Angel Raich’s claim that the production of her marijuana was not
“economic,” by relying on the definition of “economic” found in a
1966 Webster’s Dictionary. “Unlike those at issue in Lopez and Mor-

Id. at 617–18 (Rehnquist, C.J.) (internal citations omitted).
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (internal citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
87 Id. (quoting Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942)).
88 Gonzales 545 U.S. at 18.
85
86
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rison, the activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. ‘Economics’ refers to ‘the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities.’” 89 So nothing in Justice Stevens’ opinion
in Raich remotely challenges the framework of Lopez or Morrison—
not even its dictionary definition of “economic.”
Moreover, invoking Webster’s Dictionary allowed the majority
to avoid adopting the government’s theory that any activity that
substituted for a market activity was economic. 90 The government’s
theory resembled Wickard insofar as Roscoe Filburn’s farming operation could be regulated because his consumption of wheat on his
farm substituted for his buying wheat in interstate commerce. But
Wickard did not even hint at the proposition that Filburn’s intrastate
activity was “economic” activity because it substituted for interstate
commerce. No one would have doubted that Roscoe Filburn’s farming operation was economic activity regardless of whether its produce substituted for interstate commerce. The question in Wickard
was, given that Filburn’s farming operation was not commerce,
could it nevertheless be reached because it was necessary to the
regulation of interstate commerce? Because Filburn’s and countless
other farmers’ use of their own wheat, “though it may not be regarded as commerce,” 91 substituted for buying interstate wheat,
this wholly intrastate economic activity obstructed Congress’s
scheme to increase the price of interstate wheat. 92
In our briefs and at oral argument in Raich, 93 we fought hard
against the government’s market substitution theory on the
grounds that, by this logic, virtually any activity could be deemed
economic. Therefore, if the substitution theory is accepted, the
economic-noneconomic distinction would be obliterated. Our ar-

Id. at 25.
Reply Brief for Petitioners, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454).
91 Wickard, 317 U.S. at 125 (1942).
92 Id. at 128–29 (“Congress may properly have considered that wheat consumed on
the farm where grown if wholly outside the scheme of regulation would have a substantial effect in defeating and obstructing its purpose to stimulate trade therein at
increased prices.”).
93 See Br. for Resp’t at 25, Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (No. 03-1454).
89
90
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guments on this point were vindicated by the Court’s refusal to accept the government’s market substitution theory, adopting Webster’s definition of “economic” instead.
B. Applying Existing Doctrine to the Individual Insurance Mandate
How does the individual mandate fare under existing Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine? First we
have to ascertain under which theory Congress purported to act.
Does the mandate purport to regulate or protect the instrumentalities of interstate commerce? Does it purport to regulate or protect
persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the threat
may come only from intrastate activities? Or does it purport to
regulate those activities having a substantial relation to interstate
commerce, those activities that substantially affect interstate commerce?
In the Act, Congress asserted that “[t]he individual responsibility requirement provided for in this section . . . is commercial and
economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce,
as a result of the effects described in paragraph (2).” 94 In this finding, Congress confusingly refers to its own requirement as “commercial and economic in nature” and substantially affecting interstate commerce, rather than to the underlying activity being regulated. There is, of course, no such Commerce or Necessary and
Proper Clause doctrine. Nonetheless, Congress is clearly trying to
invoke the third category identified in Lopez and Morrison—and
preserved in Raich: the substantial effects doctrine.
As we have seen, the substantial effects doctrine is not a pure
application of the Commerce Clause, but is actually an assertion of
the Necessary and Proper Clause to reach activity that is neither
interstate nor commerce. Under the existing law assessing whether
a law reaching intrastate activity is “necessary” to the regulation of
interstate commerce, we must ask, (a) what is the “class of activity”

94 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(1), 124
Stat. 119 (2010).
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reached by the statute, and (b) is it economic or noneconomic? In
answering this question, the first thing to notice about all of the
substantial effects cases—including N.L.R.B., Darby, Wickard, Heart
of Atlanta, McClung, Lopez, Morrison, and Raich—is that each concerns the regulation of a class of activities in which persons have
freely chosen to engage: manufacturing steel or lumber, operating a
hotel or restaurant, possessing a gun, perpetrating gendermotivated violence, or growing marijuana.
In sum, all these cases involve activity, not inactivity. In none of
these cases did the government mandate that citizens engage in
economic activity by entering into a contract with a private company. Indeed, Congress implicitly acknowledges that existing doctrine requires economic activity in its first “finding,” when it states:
“The requirement regulates activity that is commercial and economic
in nature: economic and financial decisions about how and when
health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.” 95
So Congress is purporting to stay within existing Necessary and
Proper Clause doctrine by claiming to regulate a class of economic
activity. But what is that class of activity? It is “decisions about how
and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.” In this way, the statute speciously tries to convert inactivity into the “activity” of making a “decision.” By this reasoning, a
“decision” not to take a job or not to sell your house or not to buy a
Chevrolet is an “activity that is commercial and economic in nature” that can be mandated by Congress.
Perhaps for this reason, federal District Court Judge George
Caram Steeh, in his ruling granting the government’s motion to
dismiss the complaint brought against it by the Thomas More
Law Center, subtly changes the claim. “While plaintiffs describe
the Commerce Clause power as reaching economic activity, the
government’s characterization of the Commerce Clause reaching
economic decisions is more accurate.” 96 By this formulation, a

Id. § 1501(a)(2)(A) (emphases added).
Thomas More Ctr. v. Obama, No. 10-CV-11156, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 107416 at
*27 (E.D. Mich., Oct. 7 2010).
95
96
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“decision” is not being reached because it is an “activity” under
existing doctrine. Rather, the district court extended the power of
Congress beyond the regulation of intrastate activity to enable it to
reach “economic decisions.” By reformulating the government’s theory in this way, and referring to this as an “issue of first impression,” 97 Judge Steeh candidly exposes the novelty of the government’s claim of power, and the need to reach beyond existing doctrine to justify it.
However formulated, this shift from regulating activity to regulating “decisions” to refrain from acting obliterates the well-known
and intuitive distinction between acts and omissions. In the main,
persons are responsible for their actions, not for their failure to act.
Historically, one is not responsible for omissions to act unless one
has a preexisting duty to act. 98 Keep the word “duty” in mind, as it
will be of critical importance in the discussion of whether the Supreme Court should expand the power of Congress still further under the Necessary and Proper Clause. But for now, I will confine
myself to the two problems that are most likely to stop the Court
from accepting the idea that Congress may use its power over interstate commerce coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause to
compel persons to engage in economic activity.
The first is that such a claim of power has never before been asserted by Congress, much less validated by the Supreme Court. It is
literally unprecedented. Consider this: had the Commerce and
Necessary and Proper Clauses been used to mandate individual
conduct, every citizen would be able to recite all the mandates to
which he or she must adhere upon penalty of a fine. Yet, apart
from registering for the draft, serving on a jury, submitting a tax

Id. at *23.
RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TORTS 8 –86 (1999) (“There is no distinction more deeply
rooted in the common law and more fundamental than that between misfeasance
and nonfeasance. . . .” (quoting Bohlen, Francis, The Moral Duty to Aid Others as a
Basis of Tort Liability, 56 U. PA, L. REV. 217, 219 (1908)); Id. at 87 (“[C]ases of simple
bystander inaction or nonfeasance receive special treatment under the law. . . . The
inquiry then turns to the question of whether it is possible to find some independent
source for the duty to act.”).
97
98
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return, and responding to the census, none of us can think of any
such personal mandates. In Part V, I shall examine why these mandates differ in kind from a mandate to engage in economic activity.
Which brings me to the second problem: Accepting this theory
would open the door for an infinite variety of mandates in the future. Under this theory of “activity,” Congress can mandate individuals do virtually anything at all on the grounds that the failure
to engage in economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce. Therefore, it would effectively obliterate, once and for all,
the enumerated powers scheme that even the New Deal Court did
not abandon.
Such a doctrine would run afoul of what the Constitution says
about the powers of Congress, what the Supreme Court has consistently said about the scope of those powers, and even what Chief
Justice Marshall and Alexander Hamilton said about the scope of
the Necessary and Proper Clause. Of course, unlike district and circuit courts that are bound to follow existing Supreme Court doctrines, the Supreme Court itself may move beyond what it has previously said about the scope of congressional powers. But, for reasons I shall discuss in the Part VI, I sincerely doubt there are five
votes today to take the power of Congress where it has never gone
before.
III. THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE AND EXISTING TAX POWER
DOCTRINE
Unable to produce a single example of Congress having used its
Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause powers in this way,
defenders of the personal mandate began to shift grounds. On
March 21st, the same day the House approved the Senate version
of the legislation, the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation
released a 157-page “technical explanation” of the bill. 99 The
word “commerce” appeared nowhere therein. Instead, the personal

99 JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, TECHNICAL EXPLANATION OF THE REVENUE
PROVISIONS OF THE “RECONCILIATION ACT OF 2010,” AS AMENDED, IN COMBINATION
WITH THE “PATIENT PROTECTION AND AFFORDABLE CARE ACT,” JCX-18-10 (2010).
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mandate is dubbed an “Excise Tax on Individuals Without Essential
Health Benefits Coverage.” 100 But while the enacted bill does impose excise taxes on “high cost,” employer-sponsored insurance
plans and “indoor tanning services,” 101 the statute never describes
the regulatory “penalty” it imposes for violating the mandate as an
“excise tax.” It is expressly called a “penalty.” 102 This shift will not
work.
A. Existing Tax Power Doctrine
In the 1920s, when Congress wanted to discourage activity that
was then deemed to be solely within the police power of states, it
tried to penalize the activity using its tax power. In Bailey v. Drexel
Furniture, 103 the Supreme Court struck down such a penalty saying,
“there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a
mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” 104
Although the Court has never repudiated this principle, 105 after
the New Deal, it so broadly interpreted the commerce power that
Congress no longer needed to obviate the limits on its regulatory

Id. at 31.
I.R.C. §5000(B) (2010).
102 I.R.C. §5000(A) (2010).
103 Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20 (1922). Bailey is also referred to as the
Child Labor Tax Case.
104 Id. at 38.
105 See, e.g., Dept. of Revenue of Mont. v. Kurth Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994)
(raising the issue of whether an exaction labeled a “tax” could in reality be a penalty
for purposes of double jeopardy.) Writing for the majority, Justice Stevens reaffirmed
Bailey’s principle that even an enactment labeled a “tax,” could be found to be a penalty:
100
101

We have cautioned against invalidating a tax simply because its enforcement
might be oppressive or because the legislature’s motive was somehow suspect.
A. Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44 (1934). Yet we have also recognized that “there comes a time in the extension of the penalizing features of
the so-called tax when it loses its character as such and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment.” Id. at 46 (citing
Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U. S. 20, 38 (1922)).
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powers by taxing rather than regulating activity. Thus, under the
substantial effects doctrine, Congress may regulate or prohibit intrastate economic activity directly without invoking its taxation
power. For this reason, the principle for which Bailey still stands
became moribund. Yet precisely because a mandate to engage in
economic activity has never been upheld by the Court, the tax
power is once again being used to escape constitutional limits on
Congress’s regulatory power. 106
Supporters of the mandate cite United States v. Kahriger, 107 a
1953 case where the Court upheld a punitive tax on gambling by
saying that “[u]nless there are provisions extraneous to any tax
need, courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing
power.” 108 Yet the Court in Kahriger also cited Bailey with approval. 109 How can both stances by the Court be reconciled?
The key to understanding Kahriger is the proposition the Court
there rejected: “it is said that Congress, under the pretense of exercising its power to tax has attempted to penalize illegal intrastate
gambling through the regulatory features of the Act.” 110 In other
words, just as in Darby where the Court declined to look beyond
Congress’s assertion that it was exercising its commerce power, the
Court in Kahriger declined to look behind Congress’s assertion that
it was exercising its tax power to see whether a measure was really
a regulatory penalty. As the New Deal Court said in Sonzinsky v.
United States (1937): “Inquiry into the hidden motives which may
move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally conferred upon
it is beyond the competency of courts.” 111 But this principle cuts
both ways. Neither has the Court ever looked behind Congress’s

106See, e.g., Edward D. Kleinbard, Constitutional Kreplach, 128 TAX NOTES 755 (2010)
(asserting the tax power justification for the penalty enforcing the individual mandate).
107 United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22 (1953), overruled by Marchetti v. United
States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968).
108 Id. at 31.
109 Id. at 31 n. 10.
110 Id. at 24 (emphasis added).
111 Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513–14 (1937).

610

New York University Journal of Law & Liberty [Vol. 5:581

inadequate assertion of its commerce power to speculate as to
whether a measure could be justified as a tax.
B. Applying Existing Doctrine to the Individual Insurance Mandate
Congress simply did not enact the personal insurance mandate
pursuant to its tax powers. To the contrary, the statute expressly
says the mandate “regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature.” 112 It never mentions the tax power. The penalty is
simply there to enforce the health insurance requirement, which
cannot possibly be construed as a tax.
The Court in Sonzinisky also offered this observation: “The case
is not one where the statute contains regulatory provisions related to a
purported tax in such a way as has enabled this Court to say in other
cases that the latter is a penalty resorted to as a means of enforcing
the regulations.” 113 But this exactly describes the relationship between the individual requirement and the so-called tax. The penalty
is clearly being “resorted to as a means of enforcing” 114 a regulation
of commerce. The reasoning of Sonzinisky, therefore, strongly undercuts the claim that the penalty in the Act is a tax.
The constitutionality of the mandate must rise or fall as a regulation. Its constitutionality is not affected or enhanced by its conjunction with a penalty in the Internal Revenue Code. And if the
health insurance requirement is unconstitutional because it exceeds
the powers of Congress, then there is nothing for the penalty to enforce.
Moreover, unlike Sonzinisky, the penalty does not even purport
to be a tax. It is called a “penalty.” Although the penalty was inserted into the Internal Revenue Code, Congress then expressly
severed the penalty from the normal enforcement mechanisms of
the tax code. The failure to pay the penalty “shall not be subject to

112 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1501(a)(2)(A),
124 Stat. 119 (2010).
113 Sonzinsky, 300 U.S. at 513 (emphasis added).
114 Id.
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any criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.” 115
Nor shall the IRS “file notice of lien with respect to any property of
a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty imposed by
this section,” 116 or impose a “levy on any such property with respect to such failure.” 117 All of these restrictions undermine the
claim that, because the penalty is inserted into the Internal Revenue
Code, that it is a garden variety tax.
We are not without guidance from the Supreme Court about
the difference between a tax and a penalty. In United States v. La
Franca, the Court offered the following distinction: “A tax is an enforced contribution to provide for the support of government; a
penalty, as the word is here used, is an exaction imposed by statute
as punishment for an unlawful act.” 118 In the words of Justice
Souter, relying on La Franca, “if the concept of penalty means anything, it means punishment for an unlawful act or omission, and a
punishment for an unlawful omission is what this exaction is.” 119
By contrast, “a tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or
property for the purpose of supporting the Government.” 120 Justice
Stone described taxes as “pecuniary burdens laid upon individuals
or their property, regardless of their consent, for the purpose of defraying the expenses of government or of undertakings authorized
by it.” 121
Considered apart from the penalty, it is obvious that the individual insurance mandate cannot have been imposed to raise revenue and therefore be justified under the power of Congress to tax.
The mandate raises no revenue for the government whatsoever. To
the contrary, it commands that citizens provide revenue to private
insurance companies. But if the mandate is not an exercise of the tax

I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(A) (West 2010).
I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(B)(i) (West 2010).
117 I.R.C. §5000A(g)(2)(B)(ii) (West 2010).
118 United States v. La Franca, 282 U.S. 568, 572 (1931).
119 United States v. Reorganized CF&I Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518 U.S. 213, 224
(1996).
120 Id. (quoting New Jersey v. Anderson, 203 U.S. 483, 492 (1906)).
121 City of New York v. Feiring, 313 U. S. 283, 287 (1941) (Stone, J.).
115
116
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power, and is not independently constitutional under the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses, then it is unconstitutional
and there is nothing for the “penalty” in the “Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act” to enforce.
Given that the mandate cannot possibly be a tax, the argument
must be that the “penalty,” standing alone, is a tax. But was the
“penalty” enforcing the individual mandate enacted with “the purpose of supporting the government,” or was it instead enacted as
“punishment for an unlawful . . . omission”? All of the findings in
support of the requirement attempted to justify it exclusively as a
regulation of commerce. Nowhere was the purpose of the penalty
separately identified as raising revenue.
To the contrary, in Section 9000 et seq of Title IX of the Act, entitled, “Revenue Provisions,” 122 Congress expressly identified all the
revenue raising provisions therein including, for example, the “Excise tax on high cost employer-sponsored health coverage.” 123 We
know this list was exhaustive because its purpose was to score the
cost of the Act when Congress was laboring to bring its price tag
below one trillion dollars. The more revenue it could list in Section
9000 et seq, the lower the cost. Yet, the penalty enforcing the mandate is nowhere listed as a source of revenue.
In short, the “penalty” is explicitly justified as a penalty to coerce compliance with a regulation of economic activity and not as a
tax. None of the purposes for the penalty involve raising revenue
and the section of the Act identifying revenue provisions overlooks
the penalty. So while Congress need not specify expressly what
power it may be exercising, there is simply no authority for the
Court to recharacterize a regulation as a tax when doing so is contrary to the express and actual regulatory purpose of Congress.
We can summarize this analysis as follows. Under existing tax
power doctrine: (1) the health insurance mandate does not fit the
definition of a tax; (2) when considering whether the penalty is a
tax, courts will not look behind the fact that the statute described it

122
123

Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 9001–9023, 124 Stat. 119 (2010).
I.R.C. §4980.
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as a “penalty” to enforce a regulation of commerce to see if the
“penalty” was really a tax; (3) if a court did look behind the labels of
“penalty” and “requirement”—as the government would need for it
to do—it would then have to decide whether the purpose of the
exaction was to raise revenues, or whether it genuinely operates
instead as a penalty for failing to adhere to the requirement.
So whether we stick with form or move behind the form to inquire about the substance of the measure, under existing doctrine
neither the mandate to buy health insurance, nor the penalty enforcing it, is a tax. 124 Once again, defenders of the mandate are making
an unprecedented claim. Never before has the Court looked behind
Congress’s unconstitutional assertion of its commerce power to see
if a measure could have been justified as a tax. For that matter,
never before has a “tax” penalty been used to mandate, rather than
discourage or prohibit, economic activity.
But the government’s tax power theory is far more radical than
the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause theory precisely
because the Supreme Court has generally deferred to any invocation of the tax power to raise revenue to spend for the general welfare. This normal deference is why the mandate’s defenders shifted
the argument from the Commerce Clause to the tax power. Yet if its
theory is accepted, Congress would be able to penalize or mandate
any activity by anyone in the country, provided it limited the sanction to a fine enforced by the Internal Revenue Service.
This is a congressional power unknown and unheard of before
2010. It would effectively grant Congress a general police power.
And we know what existing doctrine says about such a power:
“The Constitution . . . withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police

124 Of course, if it is a tax, then it may be neither an income nor an excise tax but instead a direct tax on individuals. If so, then because it is not equally apportioned
among the several states, it would be an unconstitutional tax. See Steven J. Willis &
Nakku Chung, Constitutional Decapitation and Healthcare, 128 TAX NOTES 169 (2010).
But I seriously doubt the Court will ever reach this question given (a) the text of the
statute, (b) what it has previously said about examining the true motives of Congress
and the difference between and tax and a penalty, and (c) the radical implications of
accepting the government’s argument.
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power that would authorize enactment of every type of legislation.” 125 Such has been the Supreme Court’s position from the
Founding until today.
IV. ESSENTIAL TO A BROADER REGULATION OF COMMERCE
Confronted with the difficulties of justifying the mandate under
existing substantial effects doctrine or the tax power, the government has pressed a third argument: that the mandate is justified
under the Necessary and Proper Clause because it is an essential
part of a broader regulatory scheme. 126 For example, the new requirement that insurance companies accept all applicants regardless
of their pre-existing illnesses is infeasible unless everyone is forced
into the insurance pool before they get sick.
Their reasoning has three steps: (a) if Congress has the power to
regulate insurance companies under its commerce power—as the
Court so ruled in South-Eastern Underwriters 127 —and (b) it can use
this power to impose regulations banning pre-existing conditions,
then (c) it becomes necessary to mandate that everyone buy insurance. Hence, although not itself a regulation of commerce, the mandate is a necessary and proper means to exercise Congress’s power
over interstate commerce.
The government’s argument is based on dicta in United States v.
Lopez. In his opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the Gun
Free School Zone Act was not “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.” 128 This principle was mentioned again by Justice Stevens writing for the majority in Raich. 129 As we already saw, because the activity in Raich was

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995).
See Reply Memo in Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss at 14, Virginia v.
Sebelius, Civil Action No. 3:10CV188-HEH (E.D.VA. Aug. 2, 2010).
127 United States v. Se. Underwriters, 322 U.S. 533 (1944).
128 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561.
129 See Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 24–25 (2005) (Stevens, J.) (The “classification
[of marijuana as a Schedule I substance], unlike the discrete prohibition established
by the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990, was merely one of many ‘essential part[s]
125
126
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deemed by the Court to be “economic” in nature, Justice Stevens’
assertion of this principle did not entail it would apply to noneconomic activity.
That Congress could reach intrastate noneconomic activity under this theory was propounded by Justice Scalia in his concurring
opinion in Raich: “Congress may regulate even noneconomic local
activity if that regulation is a necessary part of a more general regulation of interstate commerce.” 130 And he then grounded this principle in the Necessary and Proper Clause. “As we implicitly acknowledged in Lopez, . . . Congress’s authority to enact laws necessary and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce is not limited to laws directed against economic activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.” 131 In this way, Justice Scalia
affirmed the understanding that the line of cases upholding the
power of Congress to reach wholly intrastate activity are based on
the Necessary and Proper Clause.
Of course, a majority of the Supreme Court has yet to adopt Justice Scalia’s theory as a way of reaching intrastate economic and
noneconomic activity. But to justify the health insurance mandate,
the Supreme Court would have to go beyond anything previously
written by Justice Scalia, much less by Chief Justice Rehnquist or
Justice Stevens. The Supreme Court would have to rule that Congress can regulate wholly intrastate inactivity when doing so is
deemed by Congress to be essential to a more general regulation of
commerce.
There is nothing in either Lopez or Raich to warrant the additional step beyond current doctrine to allow Congress to compel
that persons engage in economic activity when doing so is essential
to a broader regulation of commerce. (And in Part V, I will explain
why any such extension would be improper.) In Raich, both Justice

of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be
undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.’”).
130 Id. at 37.
131 Id. at 36; see also id. at 35 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“Our cases show that the regulation of intrastate activities may be necessary to and proper for the regulation of interstate commerce. . . .”).
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Stevens and Justice Scalia were attempting to deal with a rather
technical issue that arises in certain Commerce Clause cases. As Justice Thomas noticed in his dissent, 132 whereas both Lopez and Morrison were facial challenges, Raich involved the constitutionality of
the C.S.A. as applied to intrastate use of marijuana for medical use as
authorized by state law, on the ground that this subset class was
noneconomic. 133
Once one concedes the facial constitutionality of Congress’s
power over a statutorily defined class of activities, however, as was
conceded in Raich with respect to the Controlled Substances Act,
how is one to define the relevant subclass of intrastate activities that
Congress may reach? Just why is the relevant class the intrastate
possession and cultivation of marijuana for medical use as authorized by state law? Why is it not the intrastate cultivation and possession of marijuana for medical use, regardless of whether the state
has authorized it? Or why is it not the intrastate cultivation of marijuana for recreational use as authorized by state law?
This is a serious conceptual problem with as-applied Commerce
Clause challenges. I believe this was the problem that Justice Scalia
was trying to address in his concurring opinion when he invoked
the Necessary and Proper Clause to explain why Congress could
sometimes reach even noneconomic activity as a means of regulating commerce that was indeed interstate. Justice Scalia would defer

132 See Raich, 545 U.S. at 61 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“Because respondents do not
challenge on its face the CSA’s ban on marijuana, our adjudication of their as-applied
challenge casts no doubt on this Court's practice in United States v. Lopez and
United States v. Morrison. In those cases, we held that Congress, in enacting the
statutes at issue, had exceeded its Article I powers.” (citations omitted)).
133 See id. at 15 (Stevens, J.) (“Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage
of the CSA . . . was well within Congress’ commerce power. Nor do they contend
that any provision or section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of
congressional authority. Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they
argue that the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of
marijuana as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for
medical purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the
Commerce Clause.”); Id. at 59 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“Respondents are correct
that the CSA exceeds Congress' commerce power as applied to their conduct, which
is purely intrastate and noncommercial.”).
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to Congress’s judgment that, as in Wickard, it needed to draw a circle around a class of activity that includes some intrastate noneconomic activity.
In this regard, Raich truly does represent the same type of problem dealt with in Wickard. Once it is conceded that Congress has
power under the Commerce Clause over a class of interstate activities—whether regulating the interstate price of wheat or prohibiting
the interstate commerce in marijuana—then, according to Justice
Scalia, under the Necessary and Proper Clause, it can reach even
intrastate activity of the same kind if, in its judgment, the failure to
reach this activity will undercut its ability to regulate interstate
commerce. The need to address the problem of defining the relevant class of activity also explains why Justice Stevens’ opinion
stressed the fungible nature of marijuana, and even included the
production of a “fungible commodity” in his definition of commerce. 134
Properly understood, then, both Wickard and Raich deal with an
exceedingly narrow problem that arises with as-applied Commerce
Clause challenges: defining the relevant class of activities for purposes of the challenge. Had either court fully appreciated the problem it faced, it would not have had to strain so mightily to reach its
results. 135 In his concurrence, Justice Scalia came the closest to the
mark, but his analysis would have been tighter and more constrained had he confined himself to as-applied challenges to the
regulation of the intrastate subset of a class of activities that are
largely interstate in nature.

134 Id. at 22 (Stevens, J.) (“[A]s in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting
well within its authority to ‘make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper ‘to
regulate Commerce . . . among the Several States.’” (citations omitted)).
135 Nor would this difficulty arise if Nick Rosenkranz is right that there should be
no “as-applied” Commerce Clause challenges given that the subject of the Commerce
Clause is Congress and thus the proper constitutional question is whether Congress
exceeds its authority when it enacts a statute, not when the statute is applied. See
Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, The Subjects of the Constitution, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1209,
1273–79 (2010).
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In contrast with Raich (and Wickard), the lawsuits against the
individual mandate are all facial challenges to the “class of activity”
defined in the statute. No court is being asked to carve out a noneconomic subset of the class of activities that Congress chose to regulate. No one is conceding that the bulk of this class is within the
power of Congress to reach. So neither the majority opinion in
Raich, nor Justice Scalia’s concurrence, are directly on point. I fully
expect that, if confronted with a challenge to the individual mandate, Justice Scalia will appreciate the difference between the class
of inactivity being reached by the Act, and the subclass of noneconomic activity prohibited by the C.S.A.
If Justice Scalia’s theory is considered to be existing law, it fails
even to hint at a power of Congress to reach inactivity, and mandate economic activity, as a means of regulating interstate commerce. For that matter, neither does Chief Justice Rehnquist’s dicta
in Lopez that Congress can reach activity when doing so is “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, in which the
regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity
were regulated.” 136 Therefore, unless the Supreme Court is prepared to use alchemy to convert a “decision” not to act into activity,
to uphold the individual mandate would require going beyond
both existing Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clause doctrine
and Justice Scalia's concurring opinion in Raich.
If and when a majority of the Court does accept Justice Scalia’s
“essential to a broader regulatory scheme” rationale for reaching
intrastate noneconomic activity, some doctrine limiting “necessity”
under this theory will be required. The distinction between economic and noneconomic activity would obviously provide no limit
to this doctrine. The whole purpose for his concurring opinion was
to question the usefulness of that distinction in dealing with the
problems posed by Raich. Without some judicially administrable
limiting doctrine, however, the fear expressed in Lopez and Morrison

136

United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (emphasis added).
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that Congress would then possess a general police power would be
realized.
The distinction between activity and inactivity provides the
same type of judicially administrable limiting doctrine for what is
“necessary” to execute the commerce power under an “essential to
a broader regulatory scheme” theory as the economic-noneconomic
distinction provides for the substantial effects doctrine. Recall that
the economic-noneconomic distinction had not previously been discussed in the substantial effects doctrine cases when Chief Justice
Rehnquist looked back at these cases to identify this commonality.
Now that Congress has, for the first time, sought to reach inactivity,
all the Supreme Court need do is look back at its Necessary and
Proper Clause cases to see that every singe one involved the regulation of activity, not inactivity.
Limiting Congress to regulating or prohibiting activity under
both the substantial effects and the essential to a broader regulatory
scheme doctrines would serve the same purpose as the economicnoneconomic distinction. Such a formal limitation would help assure that exercises of the Necessary and Proper Clause to execute
the commerce power would be truly incidental to that power and
not be remote. Doing nothing at all involves not entering into a literally infinite set of economic transactions. Giving a discretionary
power over this set to Congress when it deems it essential to a regulation of interstate commerce would give Congress a plenary and
unlimited police power over inaction that is typically far removed
from interstate commerce.
Of course, like the distinction between economic and noneconomic activity, the activity-inactivity distinction would not perfectly distinguish between incidental and remote exercises of implied powers. But, however imperfect, some such line must be
drawn to preserve Article I’s scheme of limited and enumerated
powers. Because accepting the Government’s theory in this case
would effectively demolish that scheme, the Government’s theory is
unconstitutional.
In its current briefs, the Government implicitly acknowledges
this problem by its attempt to distinguish the health insurance
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business as “unique” in a variety of respects and thereby appear to
be providing a limiting principle. 137 But examining the substance of
the law in question is precisely the sort of inquiry into the “more or
less necessity” of a measure that has been rejected by the Supreme
Court since McCulloch. Once the power to mandate economic activity is recognized here, the Court will refuse to examine future mandates on a case-by-case basis to see if they are factually like the
health insurance mandate. Therefore, if this mandate allowed, Congress will henceforth have the power to impose mandates at its discretion regardless of the “uniqueness” of the market in question.
The government’s attempt to limit the doctrine by its factual assertions is chimerical.
To sum up, the distinction between economic and noneconomic
activity now provides a judicially administrable limit to the “necessary” prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause power to reach
wholly intrastate activity that substantially affects interstate commerce. This limiting doctrine was discovered by looking back to all
previous substantial effects cases to notice a commonality among
them. The “essential to a broader regulatory” theory of the Necessary and Proper Clause likewise requires a limiting doctrine that
can be identified by looking back at all previous cases to see that, to
date, the Court has only sanctioned Congress reaching intrastate
activity. 138
In Chief Justice Rehnquist’s words, “the pattern is clear.” 139
Under the “necessary” element of the Necessary and Proper Clause,

137 See, e.g., Brief for Defendant at 17, Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human
Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2010); Brief for Defendant at 24,
Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (N.D.
Fla. Nov. 4, 2010).
138 In his opinion, Judge Vinson viewed the activity-inactivity distinction as limiting the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause. See Florida v. U.S. Dep’t of
Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, slip op. at 39–44 (N.D. Fla. Jan.
31, 2010). That the substantial effects doctrine was based on the Necessary and
Proper Clause, however, suggests that the activity-inactivity distinction can also be
viewed as restricting the “necessary” prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause in
the context of the commerce power. It is justifiable on the same grounds as was the
economic-noneconomic distinction, and identified in the same manner.
139 Lopez, 514 U.S. at 560 (Rehnquist, C.J.).
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Congress may only regulate intrastate activity, either (a) because
such activity is economic in nature and substantially affects interstate commerce or, (b) because, whether such intrastate activity is
economic or noneconomic in nature, reaching it is essential to a
broader regulation of interstate commerce.
V. WHY THE INDIVIDUAL MANDATE IS ALSO IMPROPER
A. What the Supreme Court Has Said About “Proper”
The government’s theory that Congress can mandate that people engage in economic activity when doing so is essential to a
regulatory scheme only gets it past the requirement that the mandate be necessary to the execution of the commerce power. But the
inquiry would not end there. The Necessary and Proper Clause requires that laws be “proper” as well. Assuming the individual
mandate is deemed essential to a broader regulation of interstate
commerce and therefore is “necessary,” is it also a “proper” means
to the end of regulating interstate commerce?
In McCulloch, Chief Justice Marshall provided the following
rule of law to guide the application of the Necessary and Proper
Clause: “Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the
constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter
and spirit of the constitution, are constitutional.” 140 The requirement
that a law be “plainly adapted to that end,” concerns the matter of
means-ends fit, discussed above, when assessing a measure’s necessity. The italicized portions concern the requirement that a means
that may be conducive to an enumerated end and, therefore, necessary must also be appropriate or proper. First, such a means must
not be prohibited, and second it must be consistent with the letter
and spirit of the constitution.
Of course, because mandating economic activity on the grounds
that it is essential to the regulation of commerce is unprecedented,
there are no judicial opinions directly addressing whether such an

140

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 421 (1819) (emphasis added).
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economic mandate is “within the letter and spirit of the Constitution.” But neither has the Supreme Court been entirely silent on the
issue of the propriety of means when Congress is seeking to exercise its commerce power. As it happens, the means it held to be improper was a mandate on state governments.
In 1992, Congress used its commerce power to mandate that
any state that refused to enter into interstate compacts to dispose of
nuclear waste must take title to the nuclear waste itself. In New York
v. United States, 141 the Court held that this mandate constituted unconstitutional commandeering of state legislatures. In her opinion
for the Court, Justice O’Connor explained that “the Constitution has
never been understood to confer upon Congress the ability to require the States to govern according to Congress’ instructions.” 142
She characterized this as unconstitutional “commandeering,” a term
she took from the 1981 case of Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining &
Reclamation Ass’n.: 143 “Congress may not simply ‘commandeer the
legislative processes of the States by directly compelling them to
enact and enforce a federal regulatory program.’” 144 In New York,
the Court held that “‘the Act commandeers the legislative processes
of the States by directly compelling them to enact and enforce a federal regulatory program,’ an outcome that has never been understood to lie within the authority conferred upon Congress by the
Constitution.” 145
Then, in 1997, Congress used its commerce power to mandate
that local sheriffs run background checks on gun buyers. In Printz v.
United States, 146 the Supreme Court held that this too constituted
improper “commandeering” of state executive branch officials. In
his opinion for the Court, Justice Scalia identified a principle of state
sovereignty underlying several provisions of the Constitution.
These included the prohibition on any involuntary reduction or

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161 (1992).
Id. at 162 (O’Connor, J.).
143 Hodel v. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 288 (1981).
144 New York, 505 U.S. at 161 (quoting Hodel).
145 Id. at 176 (quoting Hodel, 452 at 288) (emphasis added).
146 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1996).
141
142

2010]

Commandeering the People

623

combination of a State’s territory in Art. IV, §3; the Judicial Power
Clause in Art. III, §2, and the Privileges and Immunities Clause in
Art. IV, §2, “which speak of the ‘Citizens’ of the States” 147 ; the
amendment provision in Article V, “which requires the votes of
three-fourths of the States to amend the Constitution” 148 ; and the
Guarantee Clause in Art. IV, §4. 149
This doctrine barring the commandeering of states has, however, come to be associated primarily with the Tenth Amendment.
“[R]esidual state sovereignty was also implicit, of course, in the
Constitution’s conferral upon Congress of not all governmental
powers, but only discrete, enumerated ones, Art. I, §8,” wrote Justice Scalia, “which implication was rendered express by the Tenth
Amendment’s assertion that ‘[t]he powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.’” 150
From the existence of residual state sovereignty expressed in
the Tenth Amendment, Justice Scalia concluded that the “Federal
Government may neither issue directives requiring the States to
address particular problems, nor command the States’ officers, or
those of their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory program.” 151 Such commandeering is “fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.” 152
In his response to the claim that this mandate on states was justified under the Necessary and Proper Clause as a means of effectuating its commerce power, Justice Scalia memorably described the
clause as “the last, best hope of those who defend ultra vires congressional action.” 153 He then explained: “When a ‘Law . . . for carrying into Execution’ the Commerce Clause violates the principle of

Id. at 919.
Id.
149 Id.
150 Id. (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. X).
151 Id. at 935.
152 Id.
153 Id. at 923.
147
148
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state sovereignty reflected in” the Tenth Amendment and other
constitutional provisions, “it is not a ‘Law . . . proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause,’ and is thus, in the words of
The Federalist, ‘merely [an] act of usurpation’ which ‘deserves to be
treated as such.’” 154 In this way, Justice Scalia made clear that, however necessary Congress might deem it to be, imposing mandates
on state legislatures and executive officers was an improper means
to the end of regulating commerce among the several states.
Nor has Justice Scalia backed away from this position. In his
concurring opinion in Raich, referring to the portions of Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch emphasized above, he wrote:
“These phrases are not merely hortatory. For example, cases such as
[Printz and New York] affirm that a law is not ‘proper for carrying
into Execution the Commerce Clause’ ‘[w]hen [it] violates [a constitutional] principle of state sovereignty.’” 155 But this principle did
not apply in Raich, he said, because “neither respondents nor the
dissenters suggest any violation of state sovereignty of the sort that
would render this regulation ‘inappropriate’ . . . ” 156
The Supreme Court’s most recent consideration of the meaning
of the Necessary and Proper Clause is United States v. Comstock, 157
which upheld the constitutionality of a federal statute allowing the
civil commitment of sexually dangerous criminals after the expiration of their sentence for the commission of a federal crime. While
it gives the Necessary and Proper Clause an expansive reading,

154 Id. at 923–24. (citations omitted). In support of this conclusion, Justice Scalia
then cited Gary Lawson & Patricia B. Granger, The “Proper” Scope of Federal Power: A
Jurisdictional Interpretation of the Sweeping Clause, 43 DUKE L.J. 267 (1993). Randy Beck
disputes both Justice Scalia’s and Lawson & Granger’s reading of “proper” on
originalist grounds, but this issue is beyond the scope of this article’s focus on existing doctrine. See Beck, supra note 39, at 626–48. Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Original
Meaning of the Necessary and Proper Clause, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 185, 188–215 (2003)
(discussing original meaning of “necessary”). As suggested in Part I, both the regulations imposed on insurance companies, and the insurance mandate imposed on individuals, most likely exceed the original scope of the enumerated powers of Congress.
155 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 39 (Scalia, J., concurring) (emphasis in original).
156 Id. at 41.
157 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010).
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Comstock offers little, if any, support for the individual mandate.
Justice Breyer’s opinion, purported to be narrow, identifies five factors that led the Court to its conclusion, 158 and may well have been
so written to attract the vote of Chief Justice Roberts. Even so, Justices Kennedy and Alito joined only in the result. In his concurring
opinion, Justice Kennedy advocated enhanced scrutiny of the connection between means and ends when considering claims of power
under the Commerce Clause, 159 strongly signaling that his joining
the majority in Raich did not represent his abandonment of his prior
stance in Lopez. 160
But for present purposes, the most important thing about Comstock is that it said nothing whatsoever about the propriety of the
means—incarceration—employed by the statute. Instead, it solely
concerned whether there was a direct enough connection between
the statute and an enumerated power. The current substantial effects doctrine requires, at minimum, that the intrastate activity being reached is economic in nature and, therefore, likely to be sufficiently connected to interstate commerce. Comstock simply does not
address the issue of "proper."
Comstock is also noteworthy for Justice Thomas’s dissenting
opinion, not only for what he says, but because it was joined by
Justice Scalia, which is a rarity in Commerce Clause cases. 161 In
his dissent, Justice Thomas reaffirmed the McCulloch standard
for assessing propriety: “The means Congress selects will be
deemed ‘necessary’ if they are ‘appropriate’ and ‘plainly adapted’

158
159

See id. at 1956-64.
See id. at 1967 (Kennedy, J., concurring):

Raich, Lopez, and Hodel were all Commerce Clause cases [that] require a tangible link to commerce, not a mere conceivable rational relation, as in Lee Optical.
. . . The rational basis referred to in the Commerce Clause context is a demonstrated link in fact, based on empirical demonstration. While undoubtedly
deferential, this may well be different from the rational-basis test as Lee Optical
described it.
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 568 (1995) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Justice Scalia did not join Justice Thomas’s originalist concurring opinions in
Lopez and Morrison and he was on the opposite side of Raich.
160
161
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to the exercise of an enumerated power, and ‘proper’ if they are not
otherwise ‘prohibited’ by the Constitution and not ‘[in]consistent’
with its ‘letter and spirit.’” 162 He concluded his dissent by quoting
from Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz: “Not long ago, this Court
described the Necessary and Proper Clause as ‘the last, best hope of
those who defend ultra vires congressional action.’” 163 And he lamented the fact that the majority opinion in Comstock “breathes new
life into that Clause, and—the Court’s protestations to the contrary
notwithstanding . . . comes perilously close to transforming the
Necessary and Proper Clause into a basis for the federal police
power that ‘we always have rejected.’” 164
So too would the use of the Necessary and Proper Clause to
uphold the individual mandate.
B. Why the Individual Mandate is an Improper Means to the Regulation of
Interstate Commerce
Because an individual mandate is an unprecedented means of
executing the commerce power, the Supreme Court has never
opined on whether it is “proper.” When the Supreme Court has
been silent on a question, it is time to turn to the Constitution itself
to see if it provides any guidance on the propriety of the government’s novel claim of Congressional power. 165
As we have seen, the anti-commandeering cases that limit the
commerce power of Congress were ultimately grounded by the Su-

162 Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1971–72. Notice that Justice Thomas reads “appropriate”
as relating to the necessity of a mean rather than its propriety. Nothing of substance
turns on whether this is correct.
163 Id. at 1983 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
164 Id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting his concurring opinion in Lopez, 514 U.S. at
584).
165 In his opinion, Judge Vinson holds that the individual mandate is an “improper” means of executing the commerce power because the rationales by which it
is allegedly justified would inevitably undermine the scheme of limited and enumerated powers, and thereby violate the letter and spirit of the Constitution. See Florida
v. U.S. Dep’t of Health and Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT, slip op. at 56–63
(N.D. Fla. Jan. 31, 2010). The analysis in this section can be viewed as providing another independent reason to conclude that the mandate is improper.
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preme Court in the text of the Tenth Amendment. Yet the letter of
the Tenth Amendment is not limited to states. It says that the “powers not delegated by the Constitution to the United States . . . are
reserved to the states respectively, or to the people”. 166 As Justice
Thomas has written, the Tenth Amendment “avoids taking any position on the division of power between the state governments and
the people of the States” 167 —a position he reasserted just last term
in his dissenting opinion in Comstock in which Justice Scalia
joined. 168 In this way, the text of the Tenth Amendment recognizes
popular as well as state sovereignty.
The Supreme Court has not been silent on the sovereignty of
the people. In Chisholm v. Georgia, 169 its first great constitutional
case, the Supreme Court examined the question of whether states
were immune from being sued by individual citizens in federal
court. By a vote of four to one, the Supreme Court rejected Georgia’s claim of sovereign immunity and affirmed the power of an
individual to sue a state for breach of contract in federal court.
To evaluate Georgia’s claim, the Justices were compelled to examine the concept of sovereignty and its relationship to the power
of an individual to sue a state to enforce his individual rights. As
Justice Cushing observed: “The rights of individuals and the justice
due to them, are as dear and precious as those of States. Indeed the
latter are founded upon the former; and the great end and object of
them must be to secure and support the rights of individuals, or
else vain is Government.” 170

166 U.S. CONST. amend. X. (emphasis added) (The Commonwealth of Virginia initially refused to ratify the Tenth Amendment because it thought the addition of these
words to the proposal that its ratification convention had recommended to Congress
vitiated the protection of state sovereignty. See Randy E. Barnett, Kurt Lash’s Majoritarian Difficulty: A Response to A Textual-Historical Theory of the Ninth Amendment,
60 STAN. L. REV. 937, 952–53 (2008) (describing Virginia’s objection to this language
and that of its U.S. Senators)).
167 U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, 514 U.S. 779, 848 (1994) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
168 United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct 1949, 1971 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
169 Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419 (2 Dall.) (1793).
170 Id. at 468.
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Chief Justice John Jay—former president of the Continental
Congress, former ambassador to Spain and France, and one of the
original co-authors of the Federalist papers—expounded on the nature of sovereignty. “[T]he sovereignty of the nation is in the people
of the nation, and the residuary sovereignty of each State in the
people of each State. . . . [A]t the Revolution, the sovereignty devolved on the people; and they are truly the sovereigns of the country. . . .” 171 Later in his opinion he referred to “this great and glorious principle, that the people are the sovereign of this country,” 172
and he referred to “the people,” not collectively, but as “fellow citizens and joint sovereigns.” 173
Justice James Wilson—member of the committee of detail at the
Philadelphia convention that selected the actual wording of the
Constitution— joined Chief Justice Jay in locating sovereignty in the
individual citizen. “The only reason, I believe, why a free man is
bound by human laws, is, that he binds himself” and he thereby
“becomes amenable to the Courts of Justice, which are formed and
authorised by those laws.” 174 Wilson then asked, “[i]f one free man,
an original sovereign, may do all this; why may not an aggregate of
free men, a collection of original sovereigns, do this likewise?” 175 For
Wilson, like Jay, whatever sovereignty states enjoyed was derivative of the ultimate sovereignty of the individual person.
Of course, the Court’s decision in Chisholm was effectively reversed by the adoption of the Eleventh Amendment, which barred
suits against states in federal court by citizens of other states. 176
And, since the 1890 case of Hans v. Louisiana, a majority of the Supreme Court has “understood the Eleventh Amendment to stand
not so much for what it says, but for the presupposition . . . which it

Id. at 471.
Id. at 479.
173 Id. (emphasis added).
174 Id. at 456.
175 Id. (emphases added).
176 See U.S. CONST. amend. XI (“The Judicial power of the United States shall not be
construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
171
172
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confirms.” 177 In the words of Chief Justice Rehnquist in Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida, this presupposition was that, “each State is
a sovereign entity in our federal system.” 178
But in affirming the underlying principle of state sovereignty
within the federal system, the Supreme Court has never repudiated
its early affirmation of popular sovereignty in Chisholm. In Yick Wo
v. Hopkins, 179 the Supreme court reaffirmed that “in our system,
while sovereign powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the people, by whom and for
whom all government exists and acts.”
If commandeering the states is an improper means of executing
a federal power under the “letter” of the Tenth Amendment “and
spirit of the Constitution,” might not commandeering the people be
improper as well? Put another way, if imposing mandates on state
legislatures and executives intrudes improperly into state sovereignty, might mandating the people improperly infringe on popular
sovereignty?
As Lon Fuller and other contracts scholars have recognized, by
forming a contract persons employ a private law-making power.
The “power of the individual to effect changes in his legal relations
with others is comparable to the power of a legislature. It is, in fact,
only a kind of political prejudice which causes us to use the word
‘law’ in one case and not in the other. . . .” 180 Mandating that individuals exercise their private legislative power is as fundamental an
intrusion into popular sovereignty as mandating that states employ
their legislative powers violates state sovereignty.
Recall that, in Printz, Justice Scalia identified several sections of
the Constitution that presupposed the principle expressed in the

one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.”).
177 Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
178 Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996) (Rehnquist, C.J.).
179 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (Matthews, J.).
180 Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–07 (1941).
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Tenth Amendment. 181 As it happens, the text of the Constitution
also contains several express prohibitions on commandeering the
people. Persons may not be mandated to quarter soldiers in their
homes in time of peace, 182 to testify against themselves in a criminal
case, 183 or to labor for another. 184 Although private property may be
taken “for public use” if just compensation is made, it may not be
commandeered for private use. 185
These express prohibitions on commandeering the people signal that mandates are different than regulations that tell persons
who choose to engage in economic activity how they must do so —
or that prohibit certain activities altogether. To see why, consider
the duties the federal government does impose on the people: register for the draft and serve if called, sit on a jury, fill out a census
form, and file a tax return. None of these duties are imposed via
Congress’s power to regulate economic behavior. Instead, all have
traditionally been considered fundamental duties that each person
owes to the government by virtue of American citizenship or residency. Each of these duties can be considered essential to the very
existence of the government, not merely convenient to the regulation of commerce.
Consider the duty to serve in the military. The Pennsylvania
constitution of 1776 declared that “every member of society hath a
right to be protected in the enjoyment of life, liberty and property,
and therefore is bound to contribute his proportion towards the
expense of that protection, and yield his personal service when necessary, or an equivalent thereto.” 186 In upholding the constitutional-

181 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 161–62 (1992); Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
182 See U.S. CONST. amend. III.
183 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
184 See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
185 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
186 PA. CONST. art. 8 (1776), reprinted in, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE 3081,
3083 (Thorpe ed., 1909); see also VT. CONST. C. 1, art. 9 (1777), reprinted in, 6 THE
FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER
ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE 4747, 3740 (using identical language); N.Y CONST. art.
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ity of the national draft during World War I, the Supreme Court
said: “It may not be doubted that the very conception of a just government and its duty to the citizen includes the reciprocal obligation of the citizen to render military service in case of need, and the
right to compel it.” 187
The Court then summarily rejected a Thirteenth Amendment
objection to the draft on the ground that it was “unable to conceive
upon what theory the exaction by government from the citizen of
the performance of his supreme and noble duty of contributing to the
defense of the rights and honor of the nation, as the result of a war
declared by the great representative body of the people, can be said
to be the imposition of involuntary servitude. . . .” 188 This assertion
of the Thirteenth Amendment in the draft case demonstrates its
anti-commandeering nature. For, unless the Court could find an
affirmative duty of citizenship on which to base conscription, the
Thirteenth Amendment’s general prohibition on commandeering
the labor of the people would clearly apply to the draft.
Can a duty to purchase health insurance from a private company possibly be justified as being on a par with these other traditionally recognized fundamental duties of citizenship? Put another
way, does the reason why a mandate is a proper means for carrying
into execution the power of Congress to raise and support an army
also justify imposing economic mandates on the people that are
convenient to its regulation of commerce among the several states?
The propriety of the insurance mandate turns on this question.
What separates the United States from other countries is the
minimal and fundamental nature of the duties its citizens owe the

40 (1777) reprinted in, 5 THE FEDERAL AND STATE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS,
COLONIAL CHARTERS AND OTHER ORGANIC LAWS OF THE STATE, supra, at 2637 (“And
whereas it is of the utmost importance to the safety of every State that it should always be in a condition of defence; and it is the duty of every man who enjoys the
protection of society to be prepared and willing to defend it; this convention therefore . . . doth ordain, determine, and declare that the militia of this State, at all times
hereafter, as well in peace as in war, shall be armed and disciplined, and in readiness
for service.”).
187 Selective Draft Law Cases, 245 U.S. 366, 378 (1918).
188 Id. at 390 (emphasis added).
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state. During World War II, the people were not commandeered to
work in defense plants or buy war bonds. Even voting is not mandated in the United States. This is why so many Americans instinctively sense that empowering Congress to commandeer the people
to engage in economic activities would fundamentally change the
relationship between themselves and their government. Conversely,
those who are not bothered by the individual mandate likely hold a
very capacious notion of the duties owed by the citizen to the
state—so capacious that they include ‘the supreme and noble duty’
to engage in any activity that Congress deems to be convenient to
its regulation of interstate commerce.
In both New York and Printz, Justices O’Connor and Scalia supplemented their analysis with pragmatic reasons why state sovereignty is important in a federal system. For example, Justice
O’Connor stressed the reduction in accountability “when, due to
federal coercion, elected state officials cannot regulate in accordance
with the views of the local electorate in matters not preempted by
federal regulation.” 189 Mandates on states are improper because,
“where the Federal Government directs the States to regulate, it
may be state officials who will bear the brunt of public disapproval,
while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.” 190
Likewise, the proposition that commandeering the people as a
means of regulating commerce violates popular sovereignty is also
supported by pragmatic considerations. Like mandates on states,
economic mandates undermine political accountability, though in a
different way. The public is acutely aware of tax increases. Rather
than incur the political cost of imposing a general tax on the public
using its tax powers, economic mandates allow Congress and the
President to escape accountability for tax increases by compelling
citizens to make payments directly to private companies.

189
190

New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1992) (O’Connor, J.).
Id.
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That the individual insurance mandate was designed to obviate
political accountability is evidenced by President Obama’s high
profile denial—while the Act was still pending in the Senate—that
the mandate constituted a tax increase. The President needed to
avoid accountability for breaking his repeated pledge not to raise
taxes on persons making below a certain amount of money, so he
vehemently denied that the mandate imposed a tax. “For us to say
that you’ve got to take a responsibility to get health insurance is
absolutely not a tax increase.” 191 One suspects that this is why the
Senate bill was crafted as a regulation of commerce enforced by a
penalty, rather than as a revenue-raising tax. As Judge Vinson
wrote when dismissing the government’s tax power theory on its
merits:
Congress should not be permitted to secure and cast politically difficult votes on controversial legislation by deliberately calling something one thing, after which the defenders
of that legislation take an “Alice-in-Wonderland” tack and
argue in court that Congress really meant something else
entirely, thereby circumventing the safeguard that exists to
keep their broad power in check. 192
Once Congress is allowed to avoid invoking its tax power by
mandating citizens to engage in economic activity, Congress can
engage in all sorts of “off budget” commands that citizens “buy”
some goods or services. The problem of accountability caused by
mandating that persons pay money to private companies implicates
concerns quite similar to those underlying the Takings Clause. 193 In

191 Interview by George Stephanopoulos with Barack Obama, U.S. President, (Sept.
9, 2009), available at http://blogs.abcnews.com/george/2009/09/obama-mandate-isnot-a-tax.html.
192 Florida v. U.S. Dept. of Health & Human Servs.,716 F.Supp.2d 1120,1143 (N.D.Fla.
2010).
193 Whether this mandated payment from private persons to private companies
also constitutes a “taking” for purposes of the Fifth Amendment is a complex question that is beyond the scope of this paper. For a suggestive discussion of why regulations compelling payments to a private party could be considered a taking because
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the first 150 years of our history, perhaps the most commonly given
example of a statute so unjust that it is not properly called a law is
the taking from A to give to B. Whether or not economic mandates
are technically “takings” under existing doctrine, however, they
raise comparable concerns. 194
For these reasons, therefore, the individual mandate is not
merely another regulation among countless ones imposed on the
American people by the federal government. It crosses an important
line between limited and unlimited government power. If a power
to impose an economic mandate because it is “convenient” to the
regulation of commerce is upheld here, then Congress could mandate any behavior so long as it is cast as part of a broad regulatory
scheme. Today it is buying government approved health insurance.
Tomorrow it could be having an annual physical or mandating
what you eat. What sounds farfetched now can change with the
political winds.
Ordinarily, persons are responsible for their failure to act—or
omissions—when they have a preexisting duty to act. A mandate to
act, therefore, presupposes the existence of a duty, such as the duty
of a citizen to defend the country. But with the individual mandate
there is no traditionally recognized pre-existing duty. The duty to
purchase health insurance is entirely of Congress’s creation. Unless
they voluntarily choose to engage in activity that is within Congress's power to regulate or prohibit, the American people retain
their sovereign power to refrain from entering into contracts with
private parties, even when commandeering them to do so may be
convenient to the regulation of commerce among the several states.

they undercut political accountability, see Chaim Gordon, Note, Protecting Peter when
the Legislature Robs Peter to Pay Paul after Empress Casino v. Giannoulias, 63 TAX L. 1299
(2010) (discussing the reasoning of the plurality opinion in Eastern Enterprises v.
Apfel, 524 U.S. 498 (1998).
194 See, e.g., Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798) (Chase, J.) (“An ACT of
the Legislature (for I cannot call it a law) contrary to the great first principles of the
social compact, cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority. [For
example,] a law that takes property from A. and gives it to B: It is against all reason
and justice, for a people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore, it
cannot be presumed that they have done it.”).
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VI. CONCLUSION: FROM CITIZENS TO SUBJECTS
The third way of assessing constitutionality is to try to predict
whether the Supreme Court will uphold or strike down the individual mandate. As everyone knows, the Supreme Court is loath to
strike down any acts of Congress, but especially legislation that enjoys popular approval and acceptance. 195 If when it reaches the Supreme Court, the “Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act” fits
this description, I would predict that the Justices will strive mightily
to uphold it. I would also predict that, as in Raich, they would avoid
appearing to adopt a virtually open-ended interpretation of the
commerce power as the government had urged. Nor would they
adopt the even more radical theory that Congress can use its tax
power to penalize any activity or inactivity so long as the penalty is
a fine collected by the IRS. Instead, they would likely invoke their
already latitudinarian interpretation of the Necessary and Proper
Clause to find that the mandate is an essential part of a broader
regulatory scheme that would be undercut if this “economic decision” to “self-insure” cannot be regulated.
But suppose that, when the “Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act” reaches the Court, it is perceived by the Justices to be unpopular. Suppose it is also widely perceived to have been adopted
by a bare partisan majority employing unusual and suspect parliamentary maneuvers to avoid the consequences of the loss of “Ted
Kennedy’s” seat in the Senate—a senatorial election that turned on
opposition to this particular measure in Massachusetts of all
places. 196 Suppose this Act is also perceived to be an important reason why Democrats lost control of the House of Representatives in
an election in which Democrats ran away from the Act to avoid defeat.

195 See, e.g., BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS
INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
(2009).
196 See Michael Cooper, G.O.P. Senate Victory Stuns Democrats, N.Y.TIMES, Jan. 20, 2010,
at A1, available at, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/20/us/politics/20election.html.
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Now, I am not suggesting that the Supreme Court would strike
down the individual mandate simply because a majority perceived
it to be unpopular. But I do think that, if the Court views the Act as
manifestly unpopular, there may well be five Justices who are open
to valid constitutional objections they might otherwise resist. This
then returns us to the dubious justifications of the mandate based
on the Commerce and Necessary and Proper Clauses or the tax
power.
If the Act continues to be perceived as unpopular, I doubt that a
majority of the Court would stretch the “essential to a broader
scheme” doctrine to reach inactivity and authorize economic mandates. A majority of the justices would be quite comfortable limiting
the power of Congress to reaching activity under the “necessary”
prong of the Necessary and Proper Clause since doing so would
affect only one law: the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Perhaps most importantly, none of what is sometimes called by
law professors the “New Deal Settlement” would be called into
question by refusing to extend the substantial effects doctrine to
inactivity or by forbidding the commandeering of the people as a
means of regulating interstate commerce, thereby barring economic
mandates. The minimalist character of this theory is likely to appeal
to Chief Justice Roberts, as well as Justices Kennedy, Alito and
Scalia.
Moreover, both Justices Thomas and Scalia would immediately
see that an economic mandate must not only be necessary, it must
also be proper. These Justices would also realize that the logic of
Justice Scalia’s opinion in Printz could rather simply be carried over
to this novel claim of congressional power. Justice Scalia could
write in his sleep the opinion holding that economic mandates in
general, and the individual insurance mandate in particular, constitute an improper commandeering of the people.
True, extending its anti-commandeering doctrine from the
states to the people would be novel, but this is due entirely to the
novelty of the individual mandate itself. Before Congress attempted
to commandeer the American people, the Court never needed to
explain why such a thing was improper. The same was true when
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the Court for the first time developed its anti-commandeering doctrine in the 1990s. As Justice Scalia observed, “[f]ederal commandeering of state governments is such a novel phenomenon that this
Court’s first experience with it did not occur until the 1970’s.” 197
The first commandeering of the people as a means of regulating
interstate commerce occurred in 2010 and immediately triggered a
widespread and sustained popular outcry.
The anti-commandeering principle precisely identifies why the
individual mandate has so riled the American people. Ordinarily,
persons are responsible for their failure to act–or omissions–when
they have a preexisting duty to act. A mandate to act, therefore,
presupposes the existence of a duty. But unlike the type of preexisting fundamental duties that have traditionally been recognized,
such as the duties to defend one’s country and provide the revenue
needed to maintain its governance, there is no fundamental duty of
citizenship to enter into contracts with private parties when Congress deems it convenient to the regulation of interstate commerce.
Upholding such mandates would truly turn citizens into subjects.
Either the national government has unlimited power over the
people or its powers are limited. If the latter, there must be some
limit to the Necessary and Proper Clause. Courts could limit its
scope by examining the substance of each law to see if it is truly
necessary, but this they have declined to do. Instead, the Court has
developed formal doctrines to identify when an exercise of power is
incidental to the regulation of commerce, and when it is remote and
unnecessary. If, however, Congress is allowed to regulate any decision that has an economic effect, or that Congress deems essential to
its regulatory ambitions, then the scheme of limited and enumerated powers would be at an end. Because it is both unnecessary under existing doctrine and also improper, the individual health insurance mandate is unconstitutional.
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Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1996).

